Transformation of the contract system under conditions of sanctions pressure: problems and paradoxes of the implementation of the state order in the Russian industry

Abstract

The article explores fundamental changes in the system of state procurement of the Russian industry under the influence of sanctions pressure. The authors substantiate the need to revise the algorithms of management, control and financing of the contract system of modern Russia. Based on statistical data from the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia, the Ministry of Economic Development and analytical reviews for 2024–2026, key trends have been identified: an increase in the share of purchases from a single supplier to 21% (+87 billion rubles), paradoxical dynamics of control activities (a decrease in the number of detected violations by 23.9% with an increase in complaints from participants by 31.6%), as well as a projected slowdown in defense sectors from 30% to 4–5% growth in 2026. The author substantiates the systemic transition from the principle of transparency to the principle of closeness as a new paradigm of the contract system. The author’s classification of government procurement problems is proposed, the relationship between the growth of direct procurement and corruption risks is proved, and the role of digitalization (the Antikartel system) is shown as a compensatory mechanism. The directions of improving the regulatory framework and control mechanisms of the conflict system in the context of sanctions pressure are formulated in the form of substantiation and calculation of the risks of this system, as well as digitalization of control.